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41. Introduction
Evil has always been one of the most attractive topics for philosophers and
theologians throughout the history of Western thought; the problem of evil has
occupied a large part of the history of ethics. The questions surrounding the evils of
the world troubled the Greek mind in almost every succeeding age, with different
dimensions in philosophy, poetry, theology, and practical affairs; and understanding
evil was a huge task for almost all the medieval thinkers. Moderns, too, were deeply
moved by evil; from Kant to Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche, and Freud, to Levinas,
Bataille and Arendt. So much so that attempts recently have been made to write
alternative histories of Western philosophy in which evil has been the central point of
reference.1
Evil plays a significant role in contemporary thought, as well. The
catastrophes of the last century and their philosophical assessments as well as more
recent acts of excessive violence or natural disasters in different regions of the world
have resulted in an extensive and effectual literature on the issue, with the
contributions of the most influential philosophers of our times.
                                                           
1 See for example Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, An Alternative History of Philosophy,
Princeton University Press, 2002; Richard J. Bernstein, Radical Evil, Polity Press, 2002; The Many
Faces of Evil, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, Routledge, 2001.
5But today we are in a new era considering ‘evil studies’. Evil is no longer
treated as a subject matter for interrogation within ethics, although traditionally it had
been nothing more. Today it is rather a given situation that determines what ethics
should be. To quote from Alain Badiou:
(...) ethics designates today a principle that governs how we relate to what is
going on, a vague way of regulating our commentary on historical situations
(the ethics of human rights), technico-scientific situations (medical ethics,
bio-ethics), social situations (the ethics of being-together), media situations
(the ethics of communication), and so on2 (...) Ethics is conceived here both
as an a priori ability to discern evil (for according to the modern usage of
ethics, evil – or the negative – is primary: we presume a consensus regarding
what is barbarian), and as the ultimate principle of judgement, in particular
political judgement...3
9/11 marks the beginning of an even more concentrated appeal to this
conception of evil. Since 9/11, the Western interest in evil has grown dramatically,
and the term has acquired an even more interesting role in current political and
philosophical discussions. Since then, not only scholars from almost all disciplines of
social sciences but also politicians and media of the whole Western world have been
speaking about various themes around evil and seem to know ‘what exactly evil is’. A
quotation like ‘Today our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature’4 would
suffice to summarize the basic arguments of this attitude.
It was Richard J. Bernstein who, only ten days before the catastrophic event,
completed the manuscript of his book, Radical Evil,5 one of the alternative histories of
                                                           
2 Alain Badiou, Ethics, An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward, Verso, 2001, p.
2.
3 Alain Badiou, Ethics, An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, p. 8.
4 George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, September 11, 2001.
5 Richard J. Bernstein, The Abuse of Evil, Polity Press, 2005, p. vii.
6philosophy in which evil is the central point of reference. A couple of months after the
timely publication of his book, Bernstein could not stop thinking that the post-9/11
‘evil talks’ were not quite like the traditional philosophical interrogations of evil,
because while ‘the discourse of evil in our religious, philosophical and literary
traditions has been intended to provoke thinking, questioning, and inquiry (…) today,
the appeal to evil is being used as a political tool to obscure complex issues, to block
genuine thinking, and to stifle public discussion and debate.’6 It was for this reason
that Bernstein wrote a new book, published in 2005, and named it ‘The Abuse of
Evil’. In contrast with today’s consensus, Bernstein maintains that, ‘...[i]nterrogating
evil is an ongoing, open-ended process. Throughout I have indicated my skepticism
about the very idea of a theory of evil, if this is understood as a complete account of
what evil is. I do not think that such a theory is possible, because we cannot anticipate
what new forms of evil or vicissitudes of evil will appear.’7
It is clear that the evil that is ‘being used as a political tool to obscure complex
issues, to block genuine thinking, and to stifle public discussion and debate’ can be
used as such a tool only when it is assumed to be completely depoliticized, i.e., self-
evident and thus completely close to critical  questioning. That is to say, in our
philosophical and political discourses today, evil is ‘self-evident’, and both this ‘self-
evidence’ and this conception of ‘evil’ are problematic.8
Therefore today, in the midst of the banality of these ‘evil-talks’, it is
important 1) to stick to the idea of  ‘subjectivity of evil’; 2) to emphasize the political
                                                           
6 Ibid., p. viii.
7 Ibid., p. vii.
8 Christopher Cox and Molly Whalen, “On Evil: An Interview with Alain Badiou”, Cabinet Magazine
Online, Issue 5, Winter 2001/02. (http://www.cabinetmagazine.org /issues/5/alainbadiou.php)
7implications of current conceptions of evil; 3) and to propose genuinely and explicitly
‘politicised’ conceptions of evil in response to those seemingly depoliticized versions.
As I stated above, independent of the context in which today’s political
discourses employ it, twentieth century has produced an extensive and effectual
literature on evil, and this literature constitutes of various critical approaches. But I
maintain that, in order to accomplish the above mentioned three critical tasks, the
method that has to employed must above all emphasize the truly political nature of
evil, and also that contemporary critical approaches to evil have, until recently,
usually missed this point. Therefore a refurbished critical stance is necessary for these
three tasks.
In this study, I will first reconstruct a generic discussion within the
contemporary critical approaches to evil by presenting two radical and opposing
conceptions of evil that I take to be representative of an early critical position . While
one of these conceptions sublimates, and the other demystifies, both of them
depoliticize evil. After that I show how the above mentioned three tasks are
accomplished in today’s philosophical circles with a refurbished critical standing.
In the following chapters, I first pick up one of the most original contemporary
approaches to evil, i.e., Georges Bataille’s literary analyses which, focusing on the
function of evil in literary texts by eight authors, assume that evil is human and
deserves a humane treatment in literature. In contrast to Batailles’s sublimation of
evil, I present Hannah Arendt’s ideas about banality of evil. By critically rereading
the narratives and poems of Emily Brontë and William Blake, Sade and Baudelaire
that Bataille uses in Literature and Evil9 through Arendt’s emphasis of banality, I
                                                           
9 Georges Bataille, Literature and Evil, translated by Alastair Hamilton, Marion Boyars, 2001.
8reconstruct a ‘debate’ between the two representative critical approaches, i.e., the
debate between those who conceive evil in terms of sublimity and those who conceive
it in terms of banality. Then I show how both approaches lack today’s necessary
political emphasis; although both Bataille and Arendt begin their inquiries from
utterly political positions, they both tend to define a ‘depolitical’, almost ‘natural’
conception of evil that requires the ‘othering’ of evil, and consequently, their
positions remain within ‘supposedly depoliticised’ domains. After that, to arrive at the
politicizing of evil, I sketch out Slavoj Zizek’s and Alain Badiou’s joint attempt to
criticise post-modern acts of violence. And finally, I again read a narrative –
Irreversible, the film by Gaspar Noe of 2002 – through Slavoj Zizek’s perspectives on
evil to show how with Zizek we can accomplish the task of proposing explicitly
‘politicised’ conceptions of evil in response to its supposedly depoliticized versions.
With the discussions I reconstruct and the critical methods I employ including
literary and film criticism, I aim at emphasizing the subjectivity of evil-reception, and
in a certain sense, with reference to subjectivity of evil-reception, objectifying the
evil.10 Such an objectification either points out a universal evil inherent in all parties
(in both humanitarian projects and acts of pure violence, in both stealing and claiming
right, in both raping and philosophizing) or reduces today’s different kinds of evil-
oriented ethics to a ‘genuine nihilism’,11 which logically is nothing but the ‘janus
face’ of the former argument, as that which is inherent in all cannot provide with any
criteria for objective differentiation or definition. This, I maintain, is the best response
                                                           
10 Theodor Adorno, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Rodney Livingstone, Polity Press, 2001.
Thanks to Adorno, now we can realize when one turns to subjectivity one goes somewhere else
through subjectivity.
11 Alain Badiou, Ethics, An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, p. 3.
9to the evil that is ‘being used as a political tool to obscure complex issues, to block
genuine thinking, and to stifle public discussion and debate’.
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2. Mystifying Evil
In Literature and Evil, Bataille attempts ‘to extract the essence of literature’,
and for him ‘[l]iterature is either the essential or nothing.’ The eight authors he deals
with are those who move him most on account of the purity with which evil is
presented in their work – for instance, Blake’s achievement is ‘to reduce humanity to
poetry and poetry to Evil’, and thus to raise his ‘poems and (...) violently coloured
figures to a sublime level,’ he commends.12
For him, humanity pursues two goals: the one to preserve life, and the other to
increase the intensity of life, an intensity which ‘varies according to the greater or the
lesser liberty.’ These are the impulses that we have named good and evil, and they are
and must remain opposed, yet both of them constitute a form of value. Value by its
nature wants us to go ‘as far as possible’, its association with the principle of good
represents the point beyond which constituted society cannot advance, its association
with evil the ‘farthest point that individuals or minorities can temporarily reach.’13
Bataille sometimes claims not to privilege one form of value over the other,
yet given his equation of liberty and evil, he in fact does so when he asserts: ‘The
heart is human to the extent that it rebels (this means: to be a man is not to bow down
                                                           
12 Literature and Evil, Chapter 4 ‘William Blake’, pp. 79-80.
13 Literature and Evil, Chapter 3 ‘Michelet’, p. 74.
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before the law).’14 With reference to Baudelaire, Bataille claims that this rebellion is
not the result of the will, which can only desire good, but of fascination, which is the
contrary of, and the destruction of the will. He adds to this that it is towards ‘a perfect
silence of the will’ that poetry is now tending.15
In Bataille’s work the connection between poetry and evil is further elaborated
in terms of temporality and economy. While good is associated with care for the
future, with the anxious working and saving of the bourgeois classes, the intensity of
evil is that of the present moment. As such, it has an intimate relationship with poetry,
which, like primitive magic, operates and has its meaning in the present.
Poetry also seeks to go beyond the limits as its intensity dissolves the subject-
object relationship and ‘destroys the objects which it seizes’. This destruction should
be related to another concept essential to Batailles’s conception of evil: that of
potlatch. Potlatch is a form of sacrifice carried out by American Indian societies in
which goods are ritually destroyed or slaves slaughtered as a means of impressing
rivals. It is a prodigal squandering of wealth which, in destroying it, actualises its
essence. Bataille associates it with the conspicuous consumption of the aristocracy,
but sees ‘the real potlatch of our times’ in the poverty-stricken ‘individual who lies
down and scoffs’;16 in short, with anyone who rejects the values of bourgeois
economy.
The impulse towards potlatch – the casting forth and voiding of substance, is
only one form of what Bataille celebrates through heterology – the science of what is
completely other. In the essay ‘The Use-Value of D.-A.-F. De Sade’, Bataille divides
                                                           
14 The Impossible, translated by Robert Hurley, City Lights, 1991, pp. 147-164, in The Bataille Reader,
p. 108.
15 Literature and Evil, Chapter 2, Baudelaire, p. 57; p. 59.
16 "The Gift of Rivalry: ‘Potlatch’, The Bataille Reader, p. 208.
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human impulses into those of appropriation and excretion (which are roughly
analogous to the polarisation of good and evil presented in the essay on Baudelaire).
Appropriation is the urge leading to the creation of a homogeneous society; science
and philosophy are its most advanced manifestations. Collective excremental
impulses exist not only as sexual activity and the scatological but as laughter, ecstatic
trance, poetry and religion. God and excrement, the sacred and the soiled are identical
in nature from the psychological point of view, as they are in primitive religions.
Perhaps needless to say, Bataille is never more content than when the two are brought
together in sacrilege: hence his admiration for Sade and his hundred and twenty things
to do with body fluids and eucharistic wafers. He also asserts that it is only through a
practical heterology that revolution is possible:
Without a profound complicity of natural forces such as violent death,
gushing blood, sudden catastrophes, and the horrible cries of pain that
accompany them (...) the fall into stinking filth of what had been elevated –
without a sadistic understanding of an incontestably thundering and
torrential nature, there could be no revolutionaries, there could only be a
revolting Utopian sentimentality.17
Finally, for Bataille, evil is ultimately communication: following the
existentialist interpretation of Sade by Simone de Beauvoir18 he sees even the
relationship between torturer and victim as an attempt by the torturer to break out of
isolation. He describes the cricifixion of Christ with the words:
                                                           
17 ‘The Use-Value of D.A.F. de Sade (An Open Letter to My Current Comrades), in The Bataille
Reader, p. 157.
18 In ‘Faut-il brûler Sade?’ originally published in the December 1951 and January 1952 issues of les
Temps Modernes, English translation by Annette Michelson in The Marquis de Sade The One Hundred
and Twent Days of Sodom, compiled and translated by Austryn Wainhouse and Richard Seaver, Arrow
Books, 1990, pp. 3-64, cf. especially pp. 60-61.
13
A night of death wherein Creator and creatures bleed together and lacerated
each other and on all sides, were challenged at the extreme limits of shame:
that is what is required for their communion.
Thus ‘communication’ without which nothing exists for us, is guaranteed by
crime. ‘Communication’ is love and taints those whom it unites.(...) So
clearly the communication of human beings is guarenteed by evil.19
                                                           
19 On Nietzshe, translated by Bruce Boone, Paragon House, 1992, in The Bataille Reader, p. 93.
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3. De-mystifying Evil
If Bataille insists that evil is human and deserves a humane treatment in
literature; Arendt reminds us that it is also all-too-human. Her account of it is almost
completely the antithesis of Bataille’s. For her the quintessence of evil is expressed in
the person of Adolf Eichmann, the bureaucrat responsible for sending millions of
Jews to their deaths in the concentration camps and for carrying out this task ‘with
great zeal and the most meticulous care.’20 Her description of his trial for these crimes
shows a character so far removed from sublimity that it can be used to demonstrate
that ‘the horrible can be not only ludicrous but outright funny.’21 He was ‘not a
monster, but it was difficult indeed not to suspect that he was a clown.’22
Eichmann is everything that Bataille’s conception of evil is not: he is
bourgeois (not even petty bourgeois, but even worse, downwardly mobile into the
lower-middle class); he is conformist and career-minded. He joins the SS because his
dad failed as a travelling salesman for the Vacuum Oil Company, and he asked
himself ‘why not?’23 – it seemed like a good move at the time. Arendt accepts
Eichmann’s account of his own actions: that he did not act out of sadism or hatred,
                                                           
20 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, Revised and enlarged
edition, Penguin, 1965, 1994, p. 25.
21 Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 48.
22 Ibid., p. 54.
23 Ibid., p. 29; p. 33.
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and that he felt that ‘[h]ad he been made commander of a death-camp, he would have
had to commit suicide, since he was incapable of killing.’24 Yet he is equally
incapable of guilt or remorse, having no real sense of good and evil detached from the
laws imposed by the state at a given time, and defending his actions as ‘the duties of a
law-abiding citizen.’25 Instead of pitying his victims, he laments over himself as a
hard-luck story. He is so attached to the homogeneous that he risks recapture after his
escape to Argentina by failing to fully conceal his identity and partially continuing to
use his real name.26 Above all, he is incapable of true communication; he himself
admits: ‘Officialese (Amtsprache) is my only language’ and Arendt describes him as:
(...) genuinely incapable of uttering a single sentence that was not a cliché
(...) his inability to speak was closely connected with the inability to think,
namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else. No communication
was possible with him, not because he lied, but because he was surrounded
by the most reliable of safeguards against reality.27
That is, by the clichés which comfort him and make him feel ‘elated’.28
If Eichmann’s banality is partly the result of his narrow self-interest, Arendt
also demonstrates that the thoughtlessness created by National Socialism does not
create sublimity even when it makes people indifferent to their own lives. She retells
the story of a German doctor dealing with wounded soldiers in Konigsberg as the Red
Army approaches. He is accosted by a woman ‘who showed him a varicose vein she
had had for years but which she wanted to have treated now, because she had time’.
He tries to convince her that it is more important to escape from the Red Army, but
she is unperturbed, saying ‘The Russians will never get us. The Führer will never
                                                           
24 Ibid., p. 92.
25 Ibid., p. 135.
26 Ibid., pp. 237-238.
27 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
28 Ibid., p. 252.
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permit it. Much sooner he will gas us.’ Nobody  seems to find her attitude out of the
ordinary. Arendt comments that to complete the story: ‘There should have been one
more voice, preferably a female one, which sighing heavily, replied: And now all that
good, expensive gas has been wasted on the Jews!”29 One might add that the story
would not have been quite so much of a black comedy if it had happened anywhere
but in Königsberg: Kant might well have found in the woman with the varicose vein a
third thing to fill the mind with ever-increasing awe and admiration.30 Indeed, extreme
banality has almost the same effect upon us as the sublime: to quote Arendt’s closing
words, it is ‘fearsome, word-and-thought-defying’.31
Although Arendt herself does not construct a literary theory on the basis of her
understanding of evil, she speaks for and has partly inspired a tendency in literature
and criticism which aims to demystify evil, to strip it of its fascination. It was
doubtless under the influence of Arendt that her friend Mary McCarthy decided to
reinvent Macbeth as a superstitious golfer. W. H. Auden, who corresponded with and
had a mutual admiration with Arendt is very close to her on this point and anticipates
some of the insights in Eichmann in Jerusalem in his poems of the late 30s and early
40s. In March 1939, he wrote a poem on Herman Melville, which, dismissing the
myth of the white whale in Moby Dick as ‘intricate and false’, asserts: ‘Evil is
unspectacular and always human / And shares our bed and eats at our own table’.32
                                                           
29 Ibid., pp. 110-111.
30 A further piece of black comedy is furnished by the fact that Eichmann at one point ‘suddenly
declared with great emphasis that he had lived his whole life according to Kant’s moral precepts, and
especially according to a Kantian notion of duty.’ Arendt’s interpretation is that he had in fact
unconsciously distorted this to what Hans Frans called ‘the categorical imperative in the Third Reich:
“Act in such a way that the Führer, if he knew your action, would approve it.”’ (Eichmann in
Jerusalem, pp. 135-136).
31 Eichmann in Jerusalem, p. 252.
32 W. H. Auden, Collected Poems, ed Edward Mendelson, Faber and Faber, 1976, p. 200.
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Auden also goes further than Arendt in showing the banality of evil in more varied
forms. His ballad-tales in light verse show little men with delusions of grandeur
almost accidentally turning into the perpetrators of horrific crime; Victor, a mousy
and repressed clerk, murders his wife when he discovers she is unfaithful and ends up
in a lunatic asylum, ‘making a woman of clay’; saying: ‘I am Alpha and Omega, I
shall come, to judge the world some day’.33 He is certainly given over to the
heterological in these religious transports, especially if we make a Freudian
interpretation of the clay as excrement, but there is nothing sublime about him: he is
merely a sad case. In another ballad, James Honeyman, a narrowly ambitious
scientist, is so disappointed since he cannot interest the Ministry of Defence in the
toxic gas he had invented that he sells it to the enemy instead, causing the deaths of
himself and his family.34 He is, I would claim, the type of the philosopher who falls
down a well without even looking at the stars as his excuse; Arendt would have done
well to bear his banality in mind when she apologised for the ‘thoughtlessness’ of
Heidegger in collaborating with the Nazis.
However, perhaps the best example of the banality of evil in Auden’s work is
the character of Herod in his Christmas Oratorio ‘For the Time Being’. This character
bears more than a passing resemblance to Eichmann in lamenting over himself for
being put in such an unpleasant position, when he is about to authorise the Massacre
of the Innocents:
I’ve worked like a slave (...) I read all the official dispatches without
skipping. I’ve taken elocution lessons. I’ve hardly ever taken bribes (...) I’ve
                                                           
33Ibid.,  p. 141.
34 Ibid., pp. 134-138.
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tried to be good. I brush my teeth every night. I haven’t had sex for a month.
I object. I’m a liberal.35
Such examples – and one could give many more – might be used to refute
Bataille’s view of literature’s necessary or essential complicity with evil: but might
we not say that this is a debate between those who conceive evil in terms of sublimity
and those who conceive it in terms of banality, and simply conclude that there are two
ways of representing evil in literature – evil as sublime and evil as banal – and that
Bataille has the free to use the illustrations he prefers? The matter is, I think, a bit
more complex.
Bataille confesses: ‘I approach poetry: only to miss it.’36 Let us take him at his
word and look at what he has missed – deliberately or otherwise – in his analyses of
the poetry of Emily Brontë and William Blake. Bataille interprets these authors in
terms of heterological sublimity: that is, in terms of the fascination of death, violence,
revolution and excrement. I do not wish to claim that these insights are completely
invalid, but I hope to demonstrate that they depend on a violent decontextualisation
and also to suggest that there is a very real sense in which Blake and Brontë do not
belong in the same category of the hero of Literature and Evil’s another chapter, the
Marquis de Sade. I shall do this by considering the question of banality in these three
authors.
For Bataille, Wuthering Heights is, ‘if we accept the sadistic form of vice’, the
book in which Evil ‘has reached its most perfect form.’37 This is because it ‘raises the
question of Evil with regard to passion, as if Evil were the most powerful means of
                                                           
35 Ibid., p. 304.
36 From ‘To be Orestes’ in part 3 of The Impossible, in The Bataille Reader, p. 109.
37 Literature and Evil, p. 17.
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exposing passion.’ The trouble with his account is that it reduces Heathcliff and
Catherine Earnshaw to mythical figures, and the novel form to that of the romance or
tale. Heathcliff, he says, ‘represents a very basic state – that of the child in revolt
against the world of Good (...) committed, in his revolt, to the side of Evil’ – whilst,
strange enough, he thinks Catherine is an ‘absolutely moral character’ who suffers a
drama of ‘transgression and atonement’.38 What is missing in the account is the
counterbalance given by the perspective of Nelly Dean, who sees a kind of banality in
passion and points out the childish rather than child-like quality of Catherine’s
‘senseless, wicked rages’.39 Also missing is the way in which Heathcliff alternates
between sublimity and banality, one aspect of this being, in Bataille’s own
terminology, an oscillation between the ecstasies of the heterogeneous and the desire
for appropriation. Shortly before dying he wishes that he could annihilate his property
from the face of the earth in what we might interpret as a kind of potlatch,40 yet for
most of his life he is obsessed with accumulating money – and not only for the
purposes of revenge; he is ‘near’ and a ‘cruel, hard landlord to his tenants’,41 and
even before the death of Catherine, ‘avarice is growing with him a besetting sin.’42
The political aspect of Bataille’s attitude to childhood and to present time in his
interpretation of Wuthering Heights is also worth mentioning. For him, the novel is
ultimately a glorification of the world of childhood, of childhood seen as sublime
rebellion:
                                                           
38 Ibid.,  p. 21; p. 22.
39 Emily Brontë, Wuthering Heights, Penguin, 1994, p. 110.
40 Wuthering Heights, p. 275.
41 Ibid.,  p. 172.
42 Ibid.,  p. 98.
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The lesson of Wuthering Heights, of Greek tragedy, and ultimately of all
religions, is that there is an instinctive tendency towards divine intoxication
which the rational world of calculation cannot bear (...) Divine intoxication,
to which the instincts of childhood are so closely related, is entirely in the
present.43
Wuthering Heights does indeed give us a vision of a childhood realm of racing
wildly on the heath, in which the love (or family romance) of Catherine and
Heathcliff originates. But it also gives us painfully repulsive picture of childish
banality and selfishness, especially in the character of Linton Heathcliff. While the
childhood of Catherine and Heathcliff is chiefly one of resistance to tyranny, that of
Heathcliff’s son is one of more-or-less abject submission and revenge on those
weaker that himself: he will ‘undertake to torture any number of cats, if their teeth be
drawn and their claws pared.’44 Moreover, living entirely in the present, is also, as
Orwell and Kundera have shown, one of the symptoms of submission to
totalitarianism, of societies reduced to a sinister childishness. This fact manifests itself
in Heathcliff’s household as microcosm of a totalitarian state: most clearly in the
scene where Linton Heathcliff sucks on a piece of sugar candy, contented in a
temporary respite from his own tortures, and indifferent to the sufferings of his bride
Cathy as long as they are out of his sight and hearing.45
Bataille supports his interpretation of Wuthering Heights by quoting Brontë’s
poetry in such a way as to make it fit in with his preoccupations, taking good care to
remove any residue of conventional morality. Thus the lines from The Prisoner ‘Yet I
would lose no sting, would wish no torture less / The more that anguish racks the
earlier it will bless’ might as well have been uttered by Bataille’s Simone, who in the
                                                           
43 Literature and Evil, p. 22.
44 Wuthering Heights, p. 231.
45 Ibid., p. 234-235.
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outlined sequel to the Story of the Eye is beaten to death in a torture camp and ‘dies as
though making love’46 – what is censored is the way in which Brontë’s poem ends
with a reference to the torture as ‘A sentence, unapproved, and overruled by
heaven’.47 It is as if Bataille fears/flees/gets anxious from the possibility that a
sublime moment might be associated with the morally good.
A similar decontextualisation occurs when Bataille quotes Blake. Naturally he
focuses on lines describing ‘the sexual act in as far as it is the sacrilegious
transgression of a taboo’,48 i.e. the poem ‘I saw a chapel all of gold...’ in which a
phallic serpent forces its slimy length into a chapel and vomits its poison out on the
bread and the wine. Bataille’s interpretation is undoubtedly correct on a basic level:
scarcely anyone today would seek to deny that the poem is describing the sexual act.
Yet when Bataille describes the poem as Blake expressing ‘that burst of energy, the
violence, which he believed Evil to be’49 it seems to me that he is assimilating the
poem too easily to his own delight in the sacrilegious, in obscenity qua obscenity. If
we attempt to reconstruct what this poem may have meant to Bataille through a
knowledge of his own oeuvre, we see superimposed upon in the hapless priest in
Story of the Eye forced to ejaculate on the ciborium before being murdered50 and, as
the poem ends with the words ‘So I turn’d into a sty / And laid me down among the
swine’, we see Sir Edmund and Simone tossing themselves off outside a pigsty with a
‘luscious streetwalker’ imprisoned inside, wearing only cami-knickers, collapsed in a
                                                           
46 ‘Outline of a Sequel to Story of the Eye’ in Georges Bataille, Story of the Eye, translated by Joachim
Neugroschal, Penguin, 1979, 1982, p. 79.
47 ‘The Prisoner’, The Works of the Brontë Sisters, with an introduction by Kathryn White, Wordsworth
editions, 1995, p. 68.
48 Literature and Evil, p. 20.
49 Ibid., p. 92.
50 Story of the Eye, p. 62.
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pool of liquid manure.51 What is completely lost is Blake’s implication that sexuality
shouldn’t really be like this!
Bataille’s essay closes with an extract from what he calls an ‘incomparable
poem’ which is presented as a ‘faithful image’ of Blake’s ‘incongruous liberty’ and
‘festive turbulence’.52 The poem is Blake’s riposte to Klopstack, who had criticised
the coarse and scatological elements in English poetry. Let me quote the passage in
full:
When Klopstock England defied,
Uprose William Blake in his pride;
For old Nobodaddy aloft
Farted and belched and cough’d;
Then swore a great oath that made heaven quake,
And call’d aloud to English Blake.
Blake was giving his body ease
At Lambeth beneath the poplar trees.
From his seat then started he,
And turn’d him round three times three.
The Moon at that sight blush’d scarlet red,
The stars threw down their cups&fled.
Seen from Bataille’s perspective this amounts to a violent celebration of
scatology which raises the excremental to the very stars which it obliterates. Ending
the poem at this point invites us to take it straight – to assimilate it to the moment in
Jerusalem where ‘the starry heavens are fled from the might limbs of Albion’.53 Blake
ends the poem in another way. Having duly punished Klopstock by twisting his
bowels and then pitifully untwisting them, he concludes:
If Blake could do this when he rose up from shite
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What might he not do if he sat down to write?54
It is a shame that Bataille omitted these lines, since they make two things
clear: first, that for Blake at least, there actually is a clear distinction between writing
and shite-ing. The second is that this poem is supposed to be funny: it belongs to the
satirical tradition. The target of the satire is not only Klopstock, but Nobadaddy,
symbol of jealousy, repression and authority. The lines referring to him first occur in a
poem from Blake’s notebook which begins like this:
Let the brothels of Paris be opened,
With many an alluring dance
To awake the physicians through the city
Said the beautiful Queen of France.
Then old Nobodaddy aloft
Farted and belched and coughed
And said ‘I love hanging and drawing and quartering
Every bit as well as war and slaughtering’.55
We have here a concentrated attack on the violence of authority and its
complicity with imagined forms of sexual freedom, which shows us the extent to
which Bataille’s heterological reading oversimplifies Blake by equating his
Revolutionary sympathies with a blanket validation of violence, or even of the sexual.
Perhaps I am unfair to Bataille in focusing on his excisions: all quotation is
violence – leading to the apologetic: I have had to cut him in order to use him,56 and I
am of course cutting and using in my turn. However, what is missing in his account is
not only certain aspects of Blake, but an awareness of how in the scatological British
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tradition that had inspired Klopstock’s disgust, the heterological functions as critique.
In the words of Camille Paglia, to piss on is to criticise.57 This is either done through
the fantasy of voiding one’s own body fluids, as Byron invites us to do upon the grave
of Castlereagh,58 or by revealing the banality of the satirised by showing them in the
act of excretion or wallowing in their own excremental matter: this is why Nobodaddy
farts and belches and coughs. The obvious examples of this tradition are Rochester
and Swift.
However, I would like to take Pope’s portrait of Lord Hervey as Sporus in the
‘Epistle to Arbuthnot’ as the supreme example of the deployment of heterological
banality in satire. Sporus, like Eichmann, is a man lacking real character, who adapts
himself to the moment, at home in any element: an ‘Amphibious thing’.59 As Paglia
points out in her brilliant account of the court hermaphrodite, Sporus is a type who is
always with us: he is in governments, corporations – and university departments. He
invites scatological insult (‘a brown nose, an ass-licker’) because ‘sycophancy is
political sodomy’ and ‘shameless self-abasement is unmanly, elevating bum over
head.’60 In Pope’s sublime indictment of banality, Sporus is reduced to his own body
fluids (and perhaps also the body fluids he has received). He is a ‘mere white curd of
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Ass’s milk’ who ‘spits himself abroad’:61 his essence is nothing but what he projects
out of himself,62 and this is ‘Half froth, half venom’ – evil and banal triviality in equal
measure. Appropriately enough, in this he approximates to the human condition as
theorised by Sade in Juliett, where man is described in his relation to Nature as ‘the
froth, the vapor which rises from the rarified liquid in a heated vessel’ whose essence
is to be ‘resultant (...) heterogeneous.’63
Let me return to Sade and Bataille’s comments on him in Literature and Evil. I
argue that what distinguishes Sade from Blake and Brontë is that his writings,
particularly The One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom present us banality with
scarcely any hint of critique. Bataille recognises this when he says that ‘Boredom
seeps from the monstrosity of Sade’s work’, yet he tries to present this very banality
in terms of sublimity, in the same way that Burke finds sublimity in monotonous
natural landscapes:64 ‘Interminable and monotonous enumeration alone managed to
present him with the void, the desert, for which he yearned.’65 This is to miss the
point, though Sade’s content certainly attains its true form when the text lapses into a
draft version with no artifice to relieve the endless iteration of tortures. The point is
rather the irredeemably base nature of the villains themselves. As a historical figure,
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Sade might seem to represent the antithesis of Eichmann. Whilst the latter murdered
through paperwork and claimed to be squeamish about the act of killing, Sade refused
the opportunity of condemning people to death under the Terror, claiming that one
might kill for pleasure but not in the name of Justice.66 Yet the contrast between
bureaucrat and Sadean aristocratic debauchee is not actually so big. Indeed, one of the
few redeeming features of Sade’s work is that it corrects the tendency in Arendt – and
perhaps in some public intellectuals of our time – to see banality as quintessentially
lower middle class. If we look at Sade’s aristocratic villains one of their most striking
aspects is their small-mindedness; their strange economies among their heterological
excess. Characteristically, before the final massacre at Silling, they draw up a list of
victims, but decide ‘to spare the cooks, because of their considerable talents’.67 The
final pages of The Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom might have been placed there
to convince us that evil is not essentially sublime or banal, and that the sublimity in
the works of Brontë and Blake has its origin elsewhere.
Thus Sade gives us a clue about how to view the debate between sublimity and
banality of evil. As exemplified by their secret mutual conviction that banality is
quintessentially lower middle class, both Bataille and Arendt have some implicit
political claims apart from the visible ones, and this is enough to suspect their critical
methods.
But let me put this aside for now, as since Plato, philosopher is the one who
breaks off the consensus68 and it is clear that whatever implicit claims they may have,
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Bataille’s and Arendt’s explicit political claims on evil employ critical methods to
break off the consensus. But -- to turn to the main point of this study -- in breaking off
the consensus they do not point out the subjectivity of evil-reception, on the contrary
they both pretend to have depoliticised views on a certain, almost natural evil, and
both tend to put forward some characteristics of this definitive evil. While subjectivity
of evil-reception demands us to ‘locate both good and evil in the very structure of
human subjectivity, agency, and freedom’, both Bataille and Arendt search for an
absolute evil, and always ‘elsewhere’, either by mystifying or demystifying its
contents.
So although their inquiries set sail from utterly political positions, they both
end up offering a ‘depolitical’ conception of evil, as if evil can serve as criteria for
some kind of objective, almost natural differentiation or definition, some kind of an a
priori ‘othering’. That is to say, the critical methods they employ lack the necessary
tools we need today to oppose the consensus.
28
4. Politicizing Evil
In their attempt to undermine the political ideals of our times, both Alain
Badiou and Slavoj Zizek rearticulate the spirit of the 1960s with an emphasis on
Lacan. While Badiou focuses on the understanding of and the attitudes towards evil,
Zizek introduces an original perspective on postmodern violence that enables us to
identify a threefold psychic formula of Evil; and both philosophers seek for a revival
of politics proper in their joined attempt to uncover the hypocrisy of humanitarian
compassion. Their debate on evil and human rights is quite stimulating; while Badiou
and Zizek  have been striving for a new and more relevant formulation of the political
with reference to psychoanalysis, the philosophers of the ‘post-political’ era, i.e the
era where there is no room for politics proper, have kept on searching for the roots of
the opposition to the liberal political culture. It is especially Badiou who, with
reference to 60’s, opposes the neoliberal depictions of good and evil.
Alain Badiou’s efforts to recall the spirit of the 60s could be seen in his
pamphlet on ethics69 – an analysis, critique, and reformulation of the discourse of evil
in contemporary thought – where he refers first to Foucault who declared that ‘man,
in the sense of constituent subject, is a constructed historical concept peculiar to a
certain order of discourse, and not a timeless self-evident principle capable of
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founding human rights or a universal ethics’, then to Althusser who, through his
particular science of ‘historical materialism’, argued that human rights and ethics in
the abstract sense were nothing but ideologies, and finally to Lacan who, by
distinguishing Ego from the subject, concluded that there existed no norm to ground
the idea of a human subject (a norm through which a universal morality could be
articulated). Badiou maintains that, contemporary political philosophy (or in Zizek’s
terms, the pseudo-political philosophy of the postpolitical era)70 is a betrayal against
the spirit of the 60s, because today, intellectuals, having rediscovered the virtues of
humanitarian individualism and liberal defence of rights, have already been ‘won over
to the logic of a capitalist economy and a parliamentary democracy.’ Rejecting both
the theological and the scientific (psychological, sociological, etc.) interpretations of
evil, Badiou locates good and evil in the very structure of human subjectivity, agency,
and freedom, and argues that in our philosophical and political discourses today, evil
is ‘self-evident,’ and that both this ‘self-evidence’ and this conception of evil are
problematic:
The idea of the self-evidence of evil is not, in our society, very old. It dates,
in my opinion, from the end of the 1960s, when the big political movement
of the 60s was finished (...) Today we see liberal capitalism and its political
system, parlimentarianism, as the only natural and acceptable solutions.
Every revolutionary idea is considered utopian and ultimately criminal. We
are made to believe that the global spread of capitalism and what gets called
"democracy" is the dream of all humanity. And also that the whole world
wants the authority of the American Empire, and its military police, NATO
(...) In truth, our leaders and propagandists know very well that liberal
capitalism is an inegalitarian regime, unjust, and unacceptable for the vast
majority of humanity. And they know too that our "democracy" is an
illusion.71
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Certainly Badiou and Zizek are not the first philosophers to rise up against the
apparently depoliticised ‘humanitarian compassion’ of human rights defenders, there
had always been resistance against the so called humanism of human rights policies
even before Foucault, Althusser, and Lacan, coming from a variety of world-views.
Indeed, Badiou and Zizek’s emphasis on the concept of ‘the political’ as it relates to
good and evil recalls that of Carl Schmitt who had a critical view of the post-war
‘humanitarian’ judgements on Nazi Germany. At this point, referring to Jürgen
Habermas’ discussion of Schmittian conception of the political can prove useful, as
this appeal will help us first to differenciate Schmitt’s stance from Zizek’s, and then
to compare and contrast Zizek’s conception of the political with Jürgen Habermas’,
who is certainly among those philosophers Badiou would describe as: ‘intellectuals
who, having rediscovered the virtues of humanitarian individualism and liberal
defence of rights, have already been won over to the logic of a capitalist economy and
(…) a parliamentary democracy.’
 In his attempt to rearticulate the Kantian idea of perpetual peace with the
benefit of two hundred years’ hindsight, Jürgen Habermas compassionately defends
the multicultural realm of equal rights, and focuses on Carl Schmitt’s conception of
the political and human rights – his rivals in this discussion would be, to name a few,
Jacque Ranciere, Etiéenne Balibar, Alain Badiou or Slavoj Zizek; or even Foucault,
Althusser and maybe even Lacan. But if we may, for the time being give voice to Carl
Schmitt as a sign of the poverty of a certain juridic tradition:
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We speak of the main city cemetery and tactfully keep quiet about the
slaughter house. But slaughtering is self-evident, and it would be inhumane,
even bestial, to say the word “to slaughter” out loud.72
According to Schmitt, ‘the deception of humanism has its roots in the
hypocrisy of a legal pacifism that wants to conduct “just wars” in the name of peace
and cosmopolitan rights.’73 And in fact, with his reference to hypocrisy, Schmitt
comes close to Hegel’s critique of Kant who, as Badiou remarks with rather a
superficial comment,74 is the key figure for all ideologies of human rights. Schmitt
argues that the humanitarian morality, the global fight in the name of human rights
against Evil, is deeply rooted in a serious misconception of politics, i.e. it excludes the
possibility of a concept of the foe.75 In the absence of the friend and the foe, the only
categories left behind are those of morality – good and evil –, which we apply to our
political conflicts. Hence, we regard our political rival as ‘an inhuman monster’ who
has to be exterminated. As an alternative to the cosmopolitan pacification of nations,
Schmitt seems to propose a return to limited wars – and this, for him, is exactly what
we need if we are take into account the true ‘essence of the politic.’76 Habermas
focuses on Schmitt, but, as expected, he goes further to say that the basic and common
mistake of the strong objection against the universalism of cosmopolitan rights – as
this objected universalism rests upon the conception of Man as a constituent Subject –
is to miss the distinction between morality and law. He continues in the following
pages of his essay: ‘Independent of the context in which Schmitt employs it, this
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critique of morality has had baneful effects through the history of its reception.’77
According to Habermas, only unmediated moralization of law and politics could
result in the abolishment of the political sphere, which, of course, brings us to the
question of politics proper.
Zizek has responses to both. In his ‘A Leftist Plea for Eurocentrsim’ he refers
to Jacques Ranciére’s assessment about the disavowals of politics in ‘the entire
history of European political thought`,78 who identified four main versions of this
disavowal, one of which is Parapolitics of Habermas, and the other Ultrapolitics of
Schmitt:
Arche-politics: the ‘communitarian’ attempt to define a traditional, close,
organically structured, homogeneous social scape that allows for no void in
which the political moment or event can emerge. (...)
Parapolitics: the attempt to depoliticize politics. [In para-politics] one
accepts the political conflict but reformulates it into a competition, within
the representational space, between acknowledged parties/agents for the
(temporary) occupation of the place of executive power. This para-politics,
of course, has a series of different succesive versions: (the main rupture is
that between its classical formulation and its modern Hobbesian version
which focuses on the problematic of social contract, of the alienation of
individual rights in the emergence of sovereign power. Habermasian or
Rawlsian ethics are perhaps the last philosophical vestiges of this attitude:
the attempt to deantagonize politics by way of formulating clear rules to be
obeyed so that the agonistic procedure of litigation does not explode into
politics proper.
The Marxist (or Utopian socialist) metapolitics: political conflict is fully
asserted, but as a shadow theater in which events whose proper place is in
another scene (that of economic process) are played out. (...)
The ultrapolitics of Carl Schmitt: the attempt to depoliticize the conflict by
way of bringing it to extremes, via the direct militarization of politics. In
ultrapolitics, the repressed political returns in the guise of the attempt to
resolve the deadlock of the political conflict by its false radicalization – that
is, by reformulating it as a war between us and them, our enemy, where there
is no common ground for symbolic conflict. It is deeply symptomatic, for
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example, that instead of class struggle the radical Right speaks of class (or
sexual) warfare.
Zizek, following Jacques Ranciére,79 and having overcome the anti-
eurocentricist obsession, suggests that, in contrast to all kinds of disavowals of
politics, the notion of politics proper can be traced back to ancient Greece, where
those members of demos who had no hierarchically sustained positions within the
social structure (or those who simply resisted subordination) rose up against those in
power on the basis of a presupposition that they were to represent the whole society,
the true universality. For those who are not contented with their socially determined
status, the only way to justify their resistance against subordination is to hold a
universality claim in response to the claims of those in power.
Universality claim demands the politicised group’s voice to be heard by the
other members of the society; and furthermore, this same claim enables this group to
present ‘itself as the immediate embodiment of society as such, in its universality’
against the particular power interests of those in power. Zizek concludes that politics
proper always requires a shortcut in the relation of the particular to the universal:
‘This identification of the nonpart with the whole, of the part of society with no
properly defined place (…), with the universal, is the elementary gesture of
politicization, discernible in all great democratic events (…)’
According to Zizek, the lack of this identification is the main source of post-
modern evil. In facing postmodern forms of excessive violence or evil, we are no
longer dealing with some kind of effect of the political pacification of the return of the
repressed; rather, we encounter ‘the case of the foreclosed (from the Symbolic),
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which, as we know from Lacan, returns in the Real.’80 So we could suggest that,
according to Zizek, the contemporary humanitarian, depolitically totalizing and so
foreclosing ‘gaze of some beholder’ is the ultimate source of a radical evil – an evil
which, in fact, is nothing but one of its ‘Janus faces’. With its supposedly
depoliticized identity, it is this gaze that constitutes the twentieth century figure of
evil, the Holocaust, as something not accessible to political analysis – that is to say, as
far as political analysis is concerned, it must be as accessible as the gaze itself.
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5. Objectifying Evil: A Reversal
So far I have reconstructed a generic debate between those who conceive evil
in terms of sublimity and those who conceive it in terms of banality, by critically
rereading, through Arendt’s theory of banality, the literary texts that Bataille reads in
Literature and Evil,81 and showed how both sides of the debate ignore the current
political dimension of our subject matter. I will now read another narrative, Gaspar
Noe’s Irreversible, through Slavoj Zizek’s perspectives on evil, to show how with
Zizek we can accomplish the task of repoliticizing the conceptions of evil.
The Hegelian motto ‘Evil resides in the gaze itself which perceives the object
as evil’82 is a necessary tool for Zizek who, in search for a designation for our
contemporary, postpolitical European – and non-Eurocentric – attitude towards
apparently depoliticized classifications of basic moral ideas, comes to introduce his
original perspective on postmodern violence. Zizek’s perspective enables us to
identify a threefold psychic formula of evil in understanding the critical feature of our
times: postmodern acts of excessive violence and cruelty.83 Focusing on the
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subjectivity of evil-reception, and in a sense (if I may propose an Adornoesque
comment) objectifying evil with reference to this subjectivity of evil-reception,84
Zizek was tempted to name Balibar’s notion of excessive-nonfunctional cruelty,85 the
id-evil. Let me explain these concepts further by illustrating them with the narrative of
a movie.
It is a bit difficult, and seemingly it was meant to be difficult to hear the
‘Auslander raus’ of the Irreversible, the film by Gaspar Noe of 2002. The shock of
the first few scenes, where a man’s head is crushed with a fire extinguisher and then
beautiful Monica Belluci is raped and beaten to death, shadows what we could call
racist clichés that follow. But one is tempted to argue that, quite amazingly, Zizek’s
straight reasoning on the framework of the reverse mechanism of sublimation, as he
exemplifies with the skinhead beating up foreigners, experiencing ‘the
protosublimating gesture of elevating a contingent Other (race, sex, or religion, for
example) into the absolute Otherness of the impossible Thing, the ultimate threat to
our identity, this thing that should be annihilated if we are to survive,’86 coincides
with the reverse sequence of scenes in the film. In the case of Zizek’s skinhead
scenario, first, we come across with pure evil, for considering the skinhead story ‘we
should leave all the talks about foreigners stealing our works or the threat they
represent to our Western values aside’ (as the film begins we bump into pure
enthusiastic violence, we do not know anything about its background, all we can
realize is that there is a real hatred), then after a closer look, we find that what bothers
the skinhead in the Other is that the Other appears to entertain a privileged
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relationship to the object of desire (later in the film, we find out that, the head-
crushing Albert Dupontel’s idol of a woman, his ex-wife who is now untouchable to
him, was raped by some man; as the film begins we see our hero crushing a man’s
head, but we watch to realize that the man whose head he crushes is not the rapist). It
is difficult to defy the temptation of reading the narrative as a presentation of the same
mindset with all its priorities and secondary rationalizations – with a real necessary
reversal for its own purposes, that is, to create a true sequence concerning psychic
significance.
Frankly speaking, Irreversible is the story of a beautiful middle class woman
(Monica Belluci) – a gentle, temperate, motherly figure who not only takes care of her
highly energetic and ‘boyish’ mate (Vincent Cassel) and her timid ex-husband (Albert
Dupontel), but who is also pregnant (so her motherhood is not just figurative but
dramatically actual) – raped and beaten to death (or rather raped anally to death: the
impression of the rape scene is that, before this last sexual intercourse of hers, she had
never been familiar with ‘anal pleasure’, so to speak, which is an important detail
concerning her bourgeois background of sexual morality) in a tunnel by a drug addict
who most probably is a drug dealer too, and seemingly an immigrant, unable to speak
proper French, and also gay, at the same time a ‘pimp’ as one of the characters
declares, a real maniac who sadistically enjoys to hurt others and watch others getting
hurt; in short, the absolute evil, an absolute Other. While the boyfriend (who is the
father Belluci’s future child), in search for revenge, looks for the rapist together with
two vagrants who promise to help find him, the philosopher ex-husband works hard to
prevent him from doing something wrong (in fact later in the film, but chronologically
prior to the main event, the ex-husband calls him a ‘monkey’, and throughout the
whole story, he works hard almost like a superego agent to prevent him from doing
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something wrong) – but at the end (which is the beginning of the film), the
representative of maturity and of common sense, the civilized ex-husband himself, in
his attempt to rescue his ex-wife’s boyfriend (who, with a broken arm, is about to be
raped himself by a gay friend of our rapist) exhibits an outburst of cruelty, with a fire
extinguisher in his hands, performing a live show for the drug addict psychopathic
gay maniacs who watch him with great enthusiasm.
Zizek points out the universal evil inherent in both parties, that is, both in the
humanitarian civilized attempt to protect human rights and in the pure depoliticized
evil (fundamentalisms, and, as Balibar says, the excessive violence performed by
adolescents and the homeless) – and in our case, both in the rapist and in the
philosopher. He accomplishes this by restraining the supposedly depoliticised claims
of contemporary humanitarian world-view by arguing that ‘humanitarian depoliticized
compassion is the access of evil over its political forms’,87 and thus reducing the
foreclosing claim of postpolitics to a subjective form of a power claim in whose gaze
the contemporary notion of evil is constituted. One of the vagrants – again
immigrants, this time they seduce – who promise to help the frustrated Vincent Cassel
find the rapist, argues that ‘revenge is a human right’, as if referring to the enjoyment
of a right, jouissance. The id-evil is born within the context of the elementary nature
of the relationship between pleasure that strives for the reproduction of its own closed
circuit and jouissance i.e. what remains irreducible to pleasure principle; thus,
needless to say, it is not a constituent of a particular identity.
Now there are two main characters in the film: on the one hand we have the
ex-husband who, in his efforts to pacify first the joyful couple, and then the frustrated
trinity, is almost like a superego agent; on the other hand we have somebody else –
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the pimp, the immigrant, the drug addict and drug dealer, the gay: the Rapist – the
thief. And the narrative voice, taking into account the psychic significance of events,
tells us the story through the eyes of our superego agent. It is really hard to imagine a
worse combination of racist, sexist, and religious clichés but as one of the antagonists
declares in the opening sequence of the film ‘time ruins everything.’ For the
subjective gaze of the spectator who is never permitted to catch a glimpse of the story
as a unique whole before the end, the reverse flow of time ruins this framework;
substituting it with another one, i.e., the true structure of psychic mechanisms.
The first outburst of cruelty we face is that of the philosopher, so we could
assume that we are expected to wonder from the beginning till the end the reason for
this first explosion of hatred; then the story is not that of a woman getting raped, or a
helpless impotent boyfriend who himself could be raped alongside his raped
girlfriend.  It is the story of an excessive violence which is nonfunctional, and an even
more excessive one whose source is a depolitically totalizing moral universe
delimiting violence. By postponing the ‘rest of the story’ and serving the best meal as
the starting course, the narrative voice seems to say (like Zizek saying ‘we should
leave all the talks about foreigners stealing our works or the threat they represent to
our Western values aside’) that first we should leave the details aside, and consider
the action in its purity; that the story is not going to affirm some sexist clichés at the
outset; and even that the issue at hand is that of the ‘secret solidarity’ between ‘the
violence that is not grounded in utilitarian or ideological reasons’ – that is, the id-evil
– and the seemingly depoliticized, so called humanitarian empathy, which is nothing
but one of its Janus faces. In fact, Janus, the Roman God of doorways and archways,
is the perfect figure here who could help us grasp the core relation, as he was
traditionally worshiped at the ‘beginnings’ such as harvest time, planting, marriage,
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birth etc. Janus, on the other hand, represents transition between primitive life and
civilization, between country side and city, between war and peace – between timid
philosopher and Rapist.
Then, taken in its entirety, the major figure and the most compelling character
of the Irreversible is the civilized ex-husband, Albert Dupontel, through whose eyes,
‘the rest of the story’ is some kind of complex rationalization for the so-called
humanitarian ‘compassion’ – defender of the compassionate multicultural realm of
equal rights (it does not matter whether he is face to face with a Chinese taxi driver or
a Colombian transvestite, because in this universe, they are all ‘one in difference’ – in
fact he once or twice lectures Vincent Cassel about these ideals), he ends up (or
should we say begins?) as the most cruel of all characters; because in this realm, the
only way to mark difference, to quote again, is ‘the protosublimating gesture of
elevating a contingent Other (race, sex, or religion, for example) into the absolute
Otherness of the impossible Thing, the ultimate threat to our identity, this thing that
should be annihilated if we are to survive’. It is not the boyfriend who has stolen his
beloved wife from him, nor the Rapist (it is not the Rapist whose head he crushes) – it
is the immigrant, the pimp, the gay, or in short the Other that appears to enjoy a more
intimate relation to the obscure object of his desire. It is this thief’s, this immigrant’s
abundance of jouissance that is the danger. The ex-husband’s entire existence both in
the night club where he, his ex-wife and her boyfriend entertain themselves (and
where he does nothing but lecture and watch those around him), and in the Rectum,
the gay club where he ends up with his ex-wife’s boyfriend (and where he performs
his final – but primal – act of violence), reminds us Freud’s account of Rat Man’s
face:
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At all the more important moments while he was telling his story his face
took on a very strange, composite expression. I could only interpret it as one
of horror at pleasure of his own of which he himself was unaware.88
Zizek is tempted to tell us that he who has this expression in his face is the
most dangerous; and it is his ‘quavering indecision’ that reveals us who he is.89
Irreversible is his story – which, with the intervention of an exterior narrative voice,
comes to include that which would completely be lost in a direct verbalization – and
when we are told the part of the story where he performs his outburst of violence, we
see the same indecision in his face; what exactly does he do when he stops and looks
around him in that moment of hesitation, just after hitting the gay face a couple of
times with his fire-extinguisher: is the shocking enthusiasm of his spectators, the gay
maniacs, for the cruel act, his own hidden pleasure that he reflects to the Other?
Really, what is it that makes him hit so hard with that fire extinguisher specifically to
his enemy’s face? Is it a desperate attempt to conceal his other, Janus face? Is this
why the film is named Irreversible?
If our story was that of a ‘return of the repressed’, the philosopher’s
confrontation with the Ténia (tremendous nickname of our Rapist) deep in the Rectum
and his great effort to abolish it would suggest a traditional clue for cynical
homophobia, but as the problem we are dealing here is not that of a mere repression
and pacification, but rather a more effective ‘foreclosing’ from the Symbolic – that is,
in Zizek’s terms, the loss of the appearance itself – we encounter a return in the Real
‘in the guise of new racisms’, sometimes in rather complex forms, as seen in the
philosopher’s case, and sometimes, as was told in the account of the Rapist’s
                                                           
88 Sigmund Freud, “Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosia”, in Standart Edition of Complete
Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 10, Hogarth Press, 1955, pp. 166-7.
89 Zizek, The Metastases of Enjoyment, Six Essays on Woman and Causality, p. 1.
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interference, in the form of apparently impotent, excessive and nonfunctional
outbursts of violence.
And finally, there is another figure in the film: the woman. And again, as our
narrative voice points out with perfect clarity (by presenting Belluci her mouth closed
by men first in the rape scene and then in bed of happiness with her lover) we should
not overlook the sacrificial character of this being… Monica Belluci is the center of
the humanitarian compassion and sympathy throughout the entire story of our moral
tragedy: she is the victim whose rights were violated by men who ‘obey the injunction
to follow to their utmost limit the thoroughly pathological, contingent caprices that
bring them pleasure, ruthlessly reducing all their fellow humans to the instruments of
their pleasure’90 (the reversal of the categorical imperative) – and in fact her entire
being in this universe of apparently equal men is associated with that of a victim. But
her raison d'être as the victim is the very motive which reduces her ‘humanity’ to a
‘combination of functions resisting death’; and as Badiou would add to this: although
human as the executioner is nothing more than a vile animal, we should have the
courage to add to this that human as the victim, is generally not something more
precious.91 What deprives Belluci of her basic human faculty which would enable us
to define her as a ‘being with speech’ is her very position as the victim. Through this
‘victimizing’, she was excluded completely – her mouth being closed both by her
lover and the Rapist.
‘There are no crimes, only actions,’ one of the protagonists declares in the first
scene of the film in response to his friend who is desperately in love with his own
daughter and who, because of his illegal relation to his daughter, had spent a couple of
                                                           
90 Zizek, “Kant and Sade: The Ideal Couple”, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/zizek/zizek-kant-and-sade-
the-ideal-couple.html, 03.02.2005.
91 See Alain Badiou, Ethics, An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, Chapter 1.
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years in prison. He continues: ‘they say this is wrong and you get it wrong or not’.
Zizek, conforming Hegel’s motto in subjectifying evil, would add to this that, there is
a threefold evil, one inherent in all actors: Ego-evil, Superego-evil, and Id-evil: ‘How
are we to combat effectively this Id-evil which, on account of its “elementary” nature,
remains impervious to any rational or even purely rhetorical argumentation?’92 is the
question. This ‘inherence in all actors’, and its logical consiquence that this inherence
cannot serve as some kind of an a priori criterion for natural differenciation, is the
most effective politicisation of evil.
                                                           
92 Zizek, The Metastases of Enjoyment, Six Essays on Woman and Causality, p. 71.
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Conclusion
Today, evil is treated almost like a definitive thing in itself and determines
what ethics should be. We have to return back to assess it as a variable within the
ethical interrogation. Bataille’s and Arendt’s opposing approaches to the subject
matter, taken in this study as representative of the twentieth century conceptions of
evil, neglect the ever-changing nature of evil. In post-9/11 discourses on evil, ignoring
this fact has resulted in the use of evil ‘as a political tool to obscure complex issues, to
block genuine thinking, and to stifle public discussion and debate’, and this was
possible only if all forms evil were taken as completely depolitical and thus ‘self-
evident’. Refurbished critical methods of Alain Badiou and Slavoj Zizek respond to
this situation by sticking to the ‘subjectivity of evil’, emphasizing the political
implications of current conceptions of evil, and proposing genuinely and explicitly
‘politicised’ conceptions of evil in response to those supposedly depoliticized
versions.
Bernstein’s The Abuse of Evil opens with a question from Hannah Arendt:
‘Could the activity of thinking as such, the habit of examining whatever happens to
come to pass or attract attention, regardless of results and specific content, could this
activity be among the conditions that make man abstain from evil-doing or even
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condition them against it?’93 Arendt’s emphasis here on ‘thinking’ and yet avoidance
of ‘results and specific content’, which are not characteristic of her critical stance
regarding evil, summarize the basic arguments of this study. To quote again from
Bernstein: ‘...[i]nterrogating evil is an ongoing, open-ended process.’ We have to keep
on interrogating, keeping always in mind that ‘evil resides in the gaze itself which
perceives the object as evil’.94 If evil will not be what characterizes the Other, then it
is either universal and inherent in all parties or, to mention again its logical
equivalence, a ‘genuine nothing’. Moralization of evil as such is nothing but its ‘re-
politicisation’, and this is what we exactly need to do in the midst of the banality of
today’s ‘evil talks’ on violence.
                                                           
93 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind: Thinking, vol. 1, Brace Jovanovich, 1977.
94 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 401.
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